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How do psychoanalysts know what they know? 
 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
This paper puts forward   an account of psychoanalysis as an organised  practice 
for the generation of new knowledge.  Against criticisms of psychoanalysis as a 
pseudo-science (Popper  1962) or failed science (Grunbaum 1984, 1993) it asserts 
the respect of psychoanalysis for both rational argument and empirical evidence 
over the course of its development. Its contention is that from its foundational  
moment as a  ‘revolutionary science’ (Kuhn 1962)  in the formative  work of Freud 
in The Interpretation of Dreams  (Freud 1900) and after,  psychoanalysis has 
proceeded in the mode of a ‘normal science’, that is  by recognising and 
investigating  problems that emerged from the encounter of its theoretical 
conjectures with facts, in particular the ‘clinical facts’ (Tuckett 1994)  which have 
always been its principal source of observational data.   It will be argued that while 
psychoanalysis does have  distinctive and unusual  features as a form of 
systematic inquiry, these  derive logically and appropriately  from the nature of its 
distinctive  object of study, namely unconscious mental life. Most critics of 
psychoanalysis have upheld a unitary view of science, assuming that  methods of 
investigation and proof in all scientific activity   are uniform and invariant, whatever 
their object of study.  But in reality, the sciences are diverse, not uniform, in their 
methods,  as a necessary consequence of differences between the kinds of 
phenomena which they seek to understand. (Galison and Stump 1996).   For 
example, where physics has since the beginning of the modern scientific revolution 
sought to discover general laws of nature, and  succeeded in giving  these an 
abstract mathematical expression,  biology was for centuries, following the work of 
Linnaeus, primarily a descriptive and classificatory science, (Atran  1990 ,  Hacking    
1999), and what one might describe as a science of comparative particulars.1  Not 
                                            
1
 Karen Knorr-Cetina’s Epistemic Cultures, (1999), which reports her field-study of two laboratories, 
working in the fields respectively of high-energy physics and molecular biology, reveals that these 
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even Darwin’s great discoveries fundamentally changed this mode of 
understanding  until recent years. The  Darwinist explanatory  principles of random 
mutation and natural selection gained their great  interest and power  when  they 
were applied to specific species and their relations to  particular  ecological 
environments, description and classification remaining crucial to their  application. 
The development of the human sciences introduces  a further diversity to scientific 
method, mainly because of the causal and explanatory role of  consciousness and 
its  precipitations in cultures in understanding human and social experience.  The 
intrinsic and morally-guided  interest of many human scientists in the particular and 
unique attributes of human and social subjects, as well as in the common attributes 
which they share, has added a further dimension of particularity to the human 
sciences.   
 
I will argue in this paper that many of the distinctive attributes of psychoanalytic 
methods align it with  the biological and social sciences, while its presupposition of 
the reality of an ‘unconscious’ dimension of mental life gives it a further necessary  
particularity.  Although the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ have to be given a much 
more plural specification if one is to take account of the differences which follow 
from the diversity of their objects of study, the argument of this paper is not a 
relativist one which seeks  to justify psychoanalysis as a form of knowledge on the 
grounds that ‘anything goes’. I do not assert that  because all knowledge of nature 
is  obtained through socially-organised practices and institutions,  therefore all 
forms of  understanding are as rational or irrational as each other.  On the contrary, 
the purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the similarities between 
psychoanalysis and other forms of  knowledge-generation in the human sciences, 
and to the respect for  facts, logic, observational procedure and theoretical 
inference which its best practitioners continue to uphold.  
 
 
The academic context  
 
                                                                                                                                     
differences of method continue to this day, though the development of biochemistry and molecular 
biology and the use of statistical methods and computer simulation  in evolutionary biology have 
brought some convergence of explanatory structures.   
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Psychoanalysis and the academy have not, on the whole, been friends, at least not 
in Britain.  Throughout its hundred year history, the profession of psychoanalysts 
has depended for its material existence not on salaried posts in universities, but on 
its clinical practice with private patients, who have chosen to pay for 
psychoanalysis in the hope of bringing some improvement to their lives. It has also 
found support in Britain,  in an uneven way, from the State's health  and social care 
systems,  through the funding of  mental health clinics and training institutions like 
the Tavistock Clinic, and through  mental health services which have sometimes 
employed psychoanalytically qualified people to conduct psychotherapy.  Although 
there have long been pockets of interest in psychoanalysis in the older universities, 
more in Cambridge 2 than in Oxford, also at University College London and at the 
LSE, it is only in the last ten years or so that it has found a formal  place in the 
curriculum in many universities, mainly in post-graduate programmes, and 
sometimes in the new post-1992 universities. It is now becoming common for 
trainings in psychoanalytic psychotherapy to establish university accreditation, as 
the Institute of Psychoanalysis has done for its pre-clinical  programme and the 
Tavistock Clinic for its clinical  professional trainings too.  The situation has been 
different in other countries. For example in the decades after the Second World 
War psychoanalysis became an important part of the psychiatric curriculum in 
United States medical schools (it has lost this dominant  position), and in France 
and in the United States, Lacanian psychoanalysis gained a considerable following 
in departments of literature, philosophy and other areas of the humanities. The 
interest in  psychoanalysis as a field of interest has obviously far exceeded its 
formal recognition by universities as  a legitimate field of study. But its influence on 
writers, artists, critics, and on the wider culture, has been immense, quite out of 
proportion to its academic accreditation.  
 
Psychoanalysis  has of course long been subject to forceful criticism, much of  
which has sought to deny it any intellectual respectability whatever.  Critics have 
been fearful or jealous of its cultural influence. Freud's claims for the scientific 
character of his new field of study have been strongly contested, by a succession 
                                            
2
  Research soon to be published by John Forrester on the interest in psychoanalysis taken  by 
many Cambridge University scientists in the inter-war period reveals a much broader engagement 
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of philosophers and other critics who include  Karl  Popper (1962),  Ernest Gellner 
(1985), Adolf Grunbaum  (1984, 1993), Frank Cioffi (1970, 1998), and Frederick 
Crews (1997).  More nuanced doubts about Freud's ideas were expressed by 
Wittgenstein 3, who thought that the interesting phenomena that Freud described 
such as dreams could be understood aesthetically, as different and  juxtaposed 
representations  of mental life, but that it was mistaken to see this kind of analysis   
as verifiable science.  Most of the academic criticism of psychoanalysis has 
confined itself to examination of Freud's life and writings. Few have sought to 
investigate or observe what psychoanalysts actually do, as sociologists of science 
have empirically studied the activities of natural scientists. The idea that 
psychoanalysis might be a corpus of concepts, theories and methods which evolve 
by testing themselves against evidence like those of any other  scientific 
programme seems hardly to have been considered, outside the professional field 
of psychoanalysis itself.  There have however been a number of philosophers - 
Donald Davidson (1982) , Richard Wollheim (1971, 1993, 1994),  Richard Rorty 
(1991) , even in his later years Ernest Gellner (1995)  -  who have found sense and 
value in the psychoanalytic enterprise.  Of these Wollheim was the most interested 
in its  intellectual evolution after Freud's death.      
 
 
Critical debate about  psychoanalysis 
 
Most of the best-known critics of  psychoanalysis have been concerned above all 
to question the fundamental postulate of the field. 'Do the writings of 
psychoanalysts, in particular of Freud, satisfactorily demonstrate that the 
unconscious exists?'  seems to have been the primary issue for them. While this is  
a legitimate and necessary question to ask,  it is  different from those with which 
practising psychoanalysts are mostly concerned.   Psychoanalysts  take  this 
fundamental postulate of their field  as a given, no longer seeing further point in its 
                                                                                                                                     
with Freud’s ideas than has been  recognised until now. However, this interest did not lead to much   
academic recognition of psychoanalysis in the university’s curricula or research programmes.  
3
  See Wittgenstein, in the Conversations on Freud:  excerpts from 1932-33 lectures, in 
Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations, ed. C. Barrett. Oxford: Blackwell 1996; reprinted in 
R.Wollheim and J. Hopkins, (ed)  Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge University Press 
1982.  See also J. Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud: the Myth of the Unconscious. Princeton 
University Press 1995.   
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justification,  and  instead have mainly devoted their efforts to clarifying its specific 
forms and  effects.  In this regard  the practice of psychoanalysts is like that of 
most other fields of knowledge.  In few  established  areas  of inquiry do 
practitioners or researchers spend much  time defending the  first principles, 
whether ontological or epistemological, of their subject. 4 Once a scientific field (or 
in Kuhn’s terms paradigm) has been established as an organised field of 
investigation, practitioners normally  give their attention   to particular fields of 
inquiry within it.  Such as, what is the scope of this particular theory or sub-theory?  
What observational techniques are effective in relation to this particular 
phenomenon? Which of two competing explanations of a finding in relation to its 
antecedent conditions is valid? Evolutionary biologists, for example,  no longer 
much investigate or debate the question of  whether evolution  occurs,  but instead 
are concerned to  specify  how and in what specific conditions evolutionary 
processes take place.    Sociologists of science have pointed out in a similar way, 
in argument with  philosophers such as Popper who aimed to  set out  the rules of 
science in prescriptive terms,  that practising scientists are little interested in 
abstract concepts of truth, instead being concerned with more tangible issues of 
the accuracy or reliability of observations defined as relevant to their theoretical 
concerns,  and how these are or are not  compatible with a particular theory.  
 
In other words, while most critics of psychoanalysis have been engaged in a 
continuing battle with Freud,  over the validity of his primary discoveries or 
theoretical principles, (and sometimes over his personal probity),  most 
psychoanalysts have long since assumed the validity and usefulness of these 
principles, and have been engaged in their practical development.  This difference 
between the preoccupations of psychoanalysts and their critics has been a potent 
recipe for misunderstanding,  and has often made their encounters  more like  
fundamentalist arguments of faith, than a search for understanding.  It has also 
meant that little serious  historical or empirical attention has been given to  the 
actual evolution of psychoanalytic theories  and practices, other than by 
psychoanalysts themselves.    The question I am interested to explore in this paper  
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 We might say, using Latour's formulation, that these 'first principles' become black-boxed', not 
needing further investigation unless seriously called into question. (Latour  1987).  
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is not, does psychoanalysis conform to the principles of scientific method as these 
have been defined by philosophers, but rather, what if any rule-governed  practices 
has psychoanalysis followed during the course of its  development, and how similar 
or different are these from those followed by other sciences and intellectual 
disciplines?  
 
Psychoanalysis in the consulting room  
 
The prime  locus of psychoanalytic investigation has from the beginning  been  the 
clinical consulting room, which has functioned as the principal  'laboratory' in which 
psychoanalytic discoveries have been made. This is because psychoanalysts hold 
that it is only in the relatively controlled and invariant  settings of the consulting 
room that 'unconscious' mental phenomena are clearly discernible and accessible 
to understanding. By ‘settings’ I refer to the now-conventional rules of 
psychoanalytic clinical practice in the Freudian tradition. According to these, 
sessions are allotted  a fixed duration and frequency (nowadays usually  ‘the 50 
minute hour’,  with a frequency of sessions of between once and five times per 
week.) Analysts  seek to preserve sessions from  ‘external’ disturbance, such as 
visits or telephone calls,  with much more rigour and strictness than with most 
kinds of conversational interactions.  The ‘analytic couch’ is preferred,  one reason 
for this that being that patients mostly feel less constrained when they are not 
sitting in continuous eye-contact  with their analyst. The  therapeutic situation is 
intended to be one in which analysands will find  the space to say whatever they 
wish, the analyst seeking to make the patient’s communications the primary object 
of reflection in sessions, and avoiding bringing into the relationship her  own private 
or extraneous  concerns, such as are shared in most kinds of personal relationship 
according to  everyday norms of reciprocity.  The analytic session has been  
deliberately  constructed and refined  over years as a location within which a 
patient’s inner states of mind can become apparent and available  to  reflection by 
analyst and patient together. In order for it to  serve this purpose many of the usual 
expectations of  social interaction  are denied.  It would be interesting to compare  
the psychoanalytic encounter with others  which  have some aspects in common 
with  it,  such as some kinds of educational supervision,  or the Roman Catholic 
practice of confession.  The methods of ethnomethodology, or conversation 
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analysis,  or  of Erving Goffman’s idea  of frames of interactions, might be 
empirically deployed for this purpose.    But it is clear enough from psychoanalysts’ 
own  writing that much professional consideration has been given to the clinical  
setting and   what is meant to happen within its confines. One can think, following  
Joyce McDougall’s (1986)  useful  metaphor of the  ‘theatre of the mind’ , of the 
consulting room as a stage-set devised to make  ‘unconscious scripts’ in the minds 
of patients accessible to reflection.5     
 
It should be noted that this account describes the norms of psychoanalysis as 
currently practised in the British Psychoanalytic Society and those schools of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy influenced by it. Here the reliability and strictness of 
the consulting room has long been given priority,  departing from  Freud’s  own 
earlier more flexible  approach.  Some of these ‘classical’ assumptions about the 
setting have of course been challenged by different psychoanalytic schools. Lacan, 
for example, was notorious for his apparently arbitrary disregard for the duration  of 
psychoanalytic sessions, and ‘relational psychoanalysts’ in the United States have 
criticised the hierarchical assumptions of the classical definition of the analyst-
analysand relationship, proposing that analysts be more willing to bring their  own 
preoccupations and states of mind into a more mutual  kind of  analytic 
conversation. They argue that the proper topic for analytic reflection is the ongoing 
relationship between patient and analyst, not  aspects of the patient’s unconscious 
mind of which analysts can claim to have   privileged  understanding.   Such 
changes in the definition of the setting are connected  to differences between  
theoretical beliefs. The ‘classical’ definition of the setting  derives from a ‘realist’ 
conception of the unconscious mind,  knowledge of which it is held can be best be 
obtained through the transference relationship. The ‘relational’ definition gives 
more weight  to the relations of power embedded in a culture, and the social 
repression of thoughts and feelings to which this gives rise.  On this view   analysts 
should not  presuppose their own objectivity,  since they will unavoidably represent 
in reality as well as in the fantasy of their patients  some aspects of power – e.g. 
deriving from their  gender, education, social status or ethnicity -  by which patients 
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 Attention to the countertransference makes the ‘unconscious scripts’ of analysis relevant too.  
Betty Joseph’s idea of the ‘total transference situation’  took further the implications of this idea for 
psychoanalytic technique. (Joseph 1989).  
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may be  constrained.6  There is nothing unusual in a field of investigation 
encompassing such disagreements of theory and method,  since the very  idea of 
research into what is not yet known  entails uncertainty and the probability of 
disagreements 7 
 
The consulting room as a laboratory  
 
I have developed elsewhere (Rustin 1997 and 2002) a comparison between  
Pasteur’s bacteriological laboratory,  characterised by Bruno Latour (1983, 1988) 
as the necessary condition for his discovery of microbes,   and the clinical 
consulting room and its transference relationship between analyst and analysand, 
which was  the setting which made possible  Freud's  investigations of unconscious 
mental life.   It is clear of course that  the entities which we now  understand  as   
bacteria,  and as the unconscious, both had their immense effects in the world long 
before they were   discovered  and named in these contexts of scientific 
investigation. But it was only once they had been recognised and studied in these 
controlled conditions that understanding of their properties, both inside and outside 
their respective laboratories, could be systematically developed, with large 
consequences. As Latour has put it, bacteria became   'actants' in society in new 
ways once their potency had  been identified.  Bacteria had always  caused 
infections and diseases in animals and human beings, but  it was only  once their 
properties became understood  by scientists,  when  entities  which they   observed 
experimentally in the lab were linked causally to infections occurring in  farms and 
cities, that microbes  became ‘actants’ which transformed the social world.  That is 
to say, they   became entities  around which entire public health programmes, 
practices of hygiene and medicine,  techniques of farming,  and new 
pharmaceutical industries came to be organised.   Latour’s argument has been that 
scientists change the world through discovering properties of nature, defining new  
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 These differences are perspective are explored in Fairfield et al.,  Bringing the Plague: Towards a 
Postmodern Psychoanalysis (2002).  
7
  Some of the differences between psychoanalytic traditions are the outcome of differences in 
values, in their definitions of human and moral significance.  Therefore while some theoretical  
differences amount to disagreements of fact or explanation, and can be  resolved by resort to  
evidence and argument, others arise from a difference of focus, divergent  models truthfully 
capturing  different aspects of psychic reality. Other human sciences such as anthropology and 
sociology are  similar in this  respect of their relation to values.   
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entities and things,  which as a consequence of their  discovery acquire a definite 
kind of agency in human affairs.  We can think  of atoms and molecules, electrons, 
and genes and innumerable other objects defined by scientists  in these terms.  
Sometimes this ‘export’ from the laboratory takes of the form of its construction   
“outdoors”  in a scaled-up or multiplied form  – as for example, a chemical plant, an 
oil refinery,  a factory, or as silicon chips).  By these  means things  and processes 
first discovered in a controlled scientific setting become  world-changing 
technologies.      
 
The psychoanalytic  consulting room and its practices are analogous in some 
respects to the settings and techniques of investigation devised in other forms of 
scientific inquiry.  It has  been designed to make visible its specific objects of study, 
namely unconscious mental phenomena.  In many fields of  research, defined 
objects of study, whether they be electrical impulses in the human heart or brain, or 
radiated   energy from outer space,  or the attachment behaviours of infant 
primates or humans, are only accessible to observation and study by means of 
specialised apparatuses invented for the purpose.    ‘Without laboratories, of one 
kind or  another, no science,’  might be offered as a general principle. Scientific 
revolutions, with their newly discovered objects and fields of study, normally  
develop new techniques of observation  and psychoanalysis has been no 
exception in this respect. 8 
 
Many of Freud's critics have taken the view that he failed to establish the existence 
of unconscious mental life,  and that therefore psychoanalysis has no valid object 
of study.  However, one  can  pose this question in a different way. Suppose that  
unconscious mental  states do exist, and   have a significant influence on human 
consciousness, how might they best be investigated?  The test then becomes how 
interesting, replicable and useful are the understandings achieved by the 
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 Stephen Gaukroger,  critical of the imprecision of T.S. Kuhn's concept of paradigms, developed 
the idea of 'theoretical discourses', which he sought to differentiate from one another by reference 
to their 'explanatory structures.' 'In short, an explanatory structure consists of an ontology, a domain 
of evidence, a system of concepts relating these two, and a proof structure which specifies the valid 
relations which can hold between the concepts of this system. Gaukroger  1978, p 15).   In this 
paper I am attempting to describe psychoanalysis in terms of its distinctive  ontology and  
epistemology, and show how they are related to one another. I am grateful to Louise Braddock for 
drawing my attention to Gaukroger's work.  
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psychoanalytic method.  It  has been designed to investigate states of mind which 
are both hidden from subjects, and yet shape  their thought and behaviour. It 
studies universal patterns and conflicts of thought and feeling which find  particular 
representations in dreams,  symptoms, and other symbolic  transformations.  If 
these metapsychological presuppositions have  validity, it  is not obvious what 
better alternatives there might be to the methods  devised by Freud and his  
successors  for studying them. 9     
 
Clinical understanding   
 
The clinical consulting room is both the primary context of discovery in  
psychoanalysis, and  the primary location  for the application of psychoanalytic 
knowledge.   This conjunction poses problems for the validation and accumulation 
of psychoanalytic discoveries, different from those found in most scientific fields.    
While psychoanalytic practice within the consulting room can be  relatively 
systematic and  consistent,  there are few contexts outside the consulting room 
where psychoanalytic investigation has taken  a comparably systematic or 
grounded form.   By contrast, powerful technologies and industries have  been  
developed to give controlled and routine application to many  discoveries of 
scientific laboratories.  And although ‘social techologies’ have been applied to 
organisations following the findings of the social sciences10  - consider for example 
the influence of social scientific theories on business enterprises, bureaucracies, 
schools, prisons, armies  -  the psychoanalytic ethos has generally been 
antipathetic to such  standardisation and normalisation of social  life.  Its own focus 
has been on individuals and on the  enhancement of their self-understanding, and 
in a wider extension the idea that   institutions could  become more reflective,  as 
with ‘therapeutic communities’ and the ‘democratic work-groups’ of socio-technical 
systems theory, allied to psychoanalysis in this respect. Psychoanalysis was one of 
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 Ernest  Gellner (1985) was the most interesting modern critic of Freud, because he acknowledged 
the problem of the non-transparency of human motivation, even while he disputed Freud's proposed 
remedy. By the time of his late essay 'Freud's Social Contract' (Gellner 1995) his attitude seems to 
have changed, since he there salutes Freud as one of the principal intellectual architects of modern 
enlightenment.    
10
 Foucault is the great theorist of the role of post-Enlightenment human sciences as agents of 
control.   
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the inspirations of Habermas’s conception of  democratic communication as the 
normative  basis of a good society  (Habermas  1968).  
 
Psychoanalysis is unusual in its great dependence  on the craft-knowledge of the 
consulting room for its continuing development as a field of knowledge.  In this 
respect it is different from medicine, since there traditional craft methods have 
been largely supplanted as the source of significant new knowledge of a 
generalisable kind.  While  medical doctors of course  of continue to practice 
clinical skills in the diagnosis and treatment of their individual patients,  they rely in 
this work on  the more generalised findings of laboratories, of epidemiological 
studies, and of systematic clinical  trials. They no longer depend for their 
effectiveness, as they once did, mainly on their accumulated clinical experience.  
Psychological science and psychiatry attempt to follow this ‘medical model’, but 
with only partial success, since it seems that the objects of psychological medicine 
– persons and their subjective states of mind – continue to resist  classification 
according to objective and normalising criteria.11 Psychologists and psychiatrists to 
be effective  thus continue to need the traditional craft skills of understanding and 
relating to other persons,   even when, unlike psychoanalysts,  they seek to deploy 
the technologies of  pharmacology or cognitive behaviour  therapy in clinical 
situations.  The limited  effectiveness of the more scientific psychologies are all the 
more explicable if one holds the  presuppositions of psychoanalysis concerning 
unconscious mental life  to be valid, since these suggest another necessary level 
of explanation of many disorders of mind.   
 
 
What follows from the fact that the  psychoanalytic consulting remains both the 
primary source of new psychoanalytic knowledge, and   the context of its clinical 
application,?  
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 Some psychoanalysts (e.g. Peter Fonagy (Fonagy 2003) now argue that psychoanalysis should 
move closer, in effect,  to the ‘medical model’, developing models of 'empirical research'  to 
standardise its diagnostic and treatment methods. This approach responds to  current  demands for 
‘evidence-based medicine’. (I hold however  that the practice of clinical investigation in 
psychoanalysis is a kind of empirical research.) 
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Two  kinds of psychoanalytic knowledge  are achieved in consulting room settings. 
The first of these, essential to all  good clinical practice,  is the understanding of an 
individual patient, which usually  has to be achieved by reference to an existing  
field of psychoanalytic classifications and theories.  Analysts have to ask 
themselves a number of questions, faced with a patient’s communications or non-
communications, to  establish such   understanding.  For example, what kind of 
disorder of mind and feeling is a patient suffering from, and how might this be 
defined? What hypotheses might be advanced about the origin of the patient’s 
difficulties in his earlier development?  What state of mind is being manifested, and 
perhaps actively explored,  in relation to the analyst, in what is called ‘the 
transference?’    
 
Roger Money-Kyrle  (1958) suggested that to undertake psychoanalysis 
successfully practitioners needed  two principal capacities. One is a sufficient 
knowledge of what he called psychoanalytic theories  (but which seems to include 
concepts and classifications as well as the causal propositions which theories 
embody). The other is a capacity to observe perceptively and accurately. Without  
appropriate theoretical ‘pigeon-holes’ as he called them,  it is impossible to give 
meaning to clinical observations. Without a refined observational capacity,  there 
can be no precise or apposite data to  categorise.  Money-Kyrle’s axiom is  a plain-
speaking version of Kant’s principle, ‘percepts without concepts are blind; concepts 
without percepts are empty.’   
 
Psychoanalytic clinical training in the United Kingdom  attaches a high value to 
both to the observational and to the classificatory dimensions  of clinical capacity. 
Students are taught  psychoanalytic theories and how they have developed,  in 
order that they will be equipped with a set of categories which will enable them to  
‘place’ and make sense of their clinical experience, and of the ‘material’  (a 
psychoanalytic term for clinical data) which this gives rise to.  They are also taught 
how to observe and record precisely and reliably, through  practice in  writing  up    
interactions in which they participate as observers (of infants and families) and as 
clinical practitioners over many years. Since  patients  present many forms of 
difficulty, whose nature only becomes clarified over time,  analysts need to have 
latent and available to them a considerable  corpus of  theories and classifications.  
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Only then are they likely to be able to match the variety of phenomena presented 
by their patients with enough  relevant theoretical descriptions.  Trainee 
psychoanalysts and psychotherapists are provided with experienced supervision 
over a lengthy period to help them to access the explanatory resources of their 
field as clinical situations demand.  
 
If  standardised protocols were available by which   patients could be classified  
accurately  in advance of psychoanalytic treatment, and which could determine 
what modes of treatment might be most appropriate, the situation would be a 
different one.  By contrast, a GP or a doctor  in Accident and Emergency  do have 
recourse  to written  protocols, diagnostic manuals, and varieties of routine tests to 
make  the  diagnoses through which  treatments or more specialist investigations 
are  selected.12   Although advocates of more formal research procedures and  
treatment protocols in  psychoanalysis would like it to become more like medicine 
in this respect,  this is not how  psychoanalytic psychotherapy  is now mainly 
practised.   Instead  uncertainties and individual specificities of assessment and 
clinical intervention are accepted as a necessary concomitant of  working with 
unconscious mental processes, with their  own varied  presentations. It is deemed 
that the benefits of engaging with patients’ deeper levels of unconscious motivation 
and disturbance make it worth tolerating the unpredictability of the clinical situation, 
with its open-ended agendas. 
 
An assumption of psychoanalytic therapy is that patients manifest many different 
kinds of difficulty, arising from different patterns of development.  It is thus 
expected that their states of mind may relevantly fall under several different clinical 
descriptions at once,  and that patients will rarely manifest themselves as ‘pure 
types’ of only one recognised psychological  disorder.  In contexts of  research  
which try to measure the correlation of treatment for a disorder with its clinical 
outcome, this  is sometimes described as   co-morbidity – patients  commonly 
suffering from more than one psychological difficulty.  But the problem goes well 
beyond that of ‘dual diagnosis.’  Because patients manifest different aspects of 
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 I recall the manual which the doctor in A. and E. had open on his desk, and to which he referred, 
in re-setting a finger I had dislocated in a minor accident playing football.  ‘It says here you can 
have an injection before I do this, or not, as you prefer,’ he said.     
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their personality in different moments or episodes of the clinical encounter, and 
because these may change  in the course of therapy,  it is usually the case that 
descriptions of patients need  to be complex,  drawing on several  parts of the 
psychoanalytical lexicon.   
 
One could even say that psychoanalytic practice resists  those forms of 
explanation which seek closure and simplicity  of classification. Its affinity is rather 
with modes of description  which emphasise change, process, and emergence, 
and which seek understanding through resemblance and analogy rather than by 
logical deduction from formal axioms.13  
 
The preference of psychoanalytic practice for what Clifford Geertz (1983)  called in 
another context ‘experience-near’ formulations, remaining as close as possible in 
dialogue with patients to their own  everyday speech in preference to abstract 
categorisations  is a further pressure in the direction of complexity and open-
endedness.   Wittgenstein’s affirmations of the resourcefulness of ordinary 
language in human communication, and his critique of the loss of subtlety and 
complexity involved in the formalisation of  metaphysical concepts,  help to 
understand why psychoanalysis has made the choices it has. An influential 
philosophical explication of psychoanalytic thought and practice by Richard 
Wollheim and his colleagues,  influenced by Wittgenstein, emphasised the 
closeness of psychoanalytic explanations to those of  everyday  human 
understanding and communication. Wollheim (1993a) argued  that Freud 
deepened, elaborated, and contextualised the conceptions of action of 
commonsense psychology,  but did not fundamentally depart from them.   It seems 
unlikely that psychoanalysts can bring enhanced understanding to patients of their 
own modes of thinking if they first require  them to abandon the  primary language 
through which  they understand their experience.  One advantage of 
psychoanalytic work with children, from this perspective, is that with child patients 
there is no choice but to work in experience-near ways  - theoretical debates about 
                                            
13
 The philosophical tradition located identified in the last century with A.N. Whitehead (1978) and 
Henry Bergson ( 2002), and concerned primarily with process, and which has been recently most 
strongly upheld by Gilles Deleuze (1988) might have a useful application to psychoanalysis, in its 
mainstream as well as the heretical ‘schizoanalysis’ version of it of Deleuze and Guattari  (1984 
 15 
psychoanalytic concepts are  not an option with these patients, though  they may 
be an occupational risk of  psychoanalysis with adults.     
 
The intellectual resources that  psychoanalysts need to be able to access in their 
normal clinical work might be compared not unduly fancifully with the field-guides 
which observers of nature sometimes  take with them into the countryside.  In 
these, a large number of known varieties are displayed and  classified according to 
some broad explanatory principles, but  they are  not  set out as in a systemic 
textbook or theoretical treatise.  Analysts need to be aware that the cases which 
they are likely to encounter in the consulting room (their ‘field’ visits them)  are 
often  ‘hybrids’ or ‘mixed types’ which may fall under several  theoretical 
descriptions. The problem is to bring these different classifications and 
explanations together in a way which captures the particularity of the individual 
case. The clinical practice of psychoanalysis is therefore hardly  an exact science. 
 
Psychoanalysis as a research programme 
 
But psychoanalysts do not only engage in the  clinical applications of already-
accepted ideas to new cases as they present themselves for treatment. Some 
analysts   set out deliberately to question and revise existing psychoanalytic 
theories and techniques, and I now want to consider the process by which such 
theoretical development  takes place. 
 
Psychoanalysis can be understood as the product of one of Thomas Kuhn's 
'scientific revolutions'. (Kuhn 1962. It had its moment as a 'revolutionary science' at 
its outset, when Freud established a   new 'paradigm' based on his  postulate of 
the dynamic unconscious. This was a significant departure from previous 
psychological models, including the science of neurology which had been Freud's 
original field, and in which he had done major  work.   Since then,  it has functioned 
as a programme of 'normal science' in a way quite similar to other research 
programmes, according to Kuhn's model of scientific development.  Within the 
guiding assumptions set out by Freud, which include the idea of unconscious 
                                                                                                                                     
1988). On this see Isabelle Stengers’  essay on psychoanalysis in Stengers (1997), and also, by 
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mental life, of a process of personality development from infancy with its significant 
consequences for later life, of disorders of development and personality, and of 
techniques of both investigation and therapeutic intervention, Freud  and his 
successors  sought to enlarge the scope of psychoanalytic explanation, to make 
more precise its concepts and their power to discriminate between phenomena, 
and to  improve techniques of investigation and intervention. Unsurprisingly, there 
have been significant theoretical divergences even among those who accepted 
Freud's foundational ideas. American 'Ego Psychology', the British Object-
Relations and Kleinian Schools,  and the linguistically-oriented psychoanalysis of 
Lacan, are among the best known.   Within Britain there have been divergences, 
though less substantial ones, between the three component factions of the British 
Psychoanalytic Society, the Contemporary  Freudians, the Independents, and the 
Kleinians, though there has also been considerable theoretical interchange and, 
over time, convergence between them, enabling them to co-exist within the same 
institutional framework.   
 
One needs to distinguish between the process of discovery of 'normal science', 
which involves modifications and developments in theories and methods, and the 
routine clinical  applications of accepted ideas to new cases as they present 
themselves for treatment. Just as  the majority of physicians  make no original 
contribution to medical science, but do succeed in correctly diagnosing and treating 
many patients by reference to the classifying and explanatory resources of their  
field, so most psychoanalytic clinicians  do not bring about major  revisions to 
psychoanalytic theory.  Even so, there is a sense in which much  psychoanalytic 
work – as to a degree no doubt, physical medicine too -  involves an element of   
fresh discovery, since patients’ presentations often given rise to  uncertainties in 
diagnosis and treatment. They do not appear neatly boxed and labelled, in  this or 
that location on a theoretical map, certified  as such by standard diagnostic 
measures. There seems to be an  element of ‘normal science’ – that is problem-
solving within the framework of a paradigm – in all clinical sciences, because of 
their focus on individual cases  existing in the real world, and only partially brought 
within the controlled conditions of the laboratory.  This aspect is especially marked 
                                                                                                                                     
implication,  Rustin (2002).   
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in psychoanalytic practice, because the recognition of patients’ individual 
‘uniqueness’ – the degree to  which they elude total capture by any diagnostic label 
-  is humanly  valued   by both therapists and their patients. People choose the 
‘talking cure’ as a possible solution to their problems  just because it seems  to 
incorporate a primary interest in individual selfhood.14    
  
But it is clarifying to  preserve a distinction between the generation of new 
knowledge, albeit in a 'normal scientific' mode, and the clinical application of that 
knowledge.  Major developments in psychoanalytic theory and technique have 
hitherto tended to come from a relatively small number of original and charismatic 
clinicians and theorists, who  gather round them pupils and associates  whose 
cases provide additional clinical material on which their new ideas can be tested 
and elaborated.  This identification of new psychoanalytic discoveries with their 
authors (closer to the arts than to many sciences) follows from the clinical  context 
of innovation. There has been little systematisation in psychoanalysis of the means 
of accumulating and evaluation new findings. It has remained a matter of ‘craft’ 
rather than ‘batch’, let alone ‘mass’  production, taking place in the equivalent of 
studios   rather than in the organised  environment of the scientific laboratory with 
its research teams.    
 
The classical account of the advance of scientific discovery,  advanced by Karl 
Popper and later adapted by Imre Lakatos to a post-Kuhnian framework of 
understanding, holds that advances in knowledge are typically achieved when 
'problems' or anomalies are encountered  between what is predicted within an 
established theory, and what is empirically discovered to be the case, through 
experiment  or other methods of observation.  Surprising as it may seem, this has 
also been a major  driving principle of psychoanalytic theories.15  Psychoanalysts 
have made   advances in their understanding when they found what they perceived 
                                            
14
  Neurscientific research (cf Edelman 1992) suggests a neurological basis for individual 
differences of character, in so far as neuronal pathways evolve in response to early relational 
experience. Here is one useful point of convergence between psychoanalysis, which has always 
emphased the importance of the earliest relationships, and neurobiology.  
15
 I have developed this argument at greater length in Rustin (1997/2002). A book length study by 
Judith M. Hughes (2004) has described the development of these and some other key concepts in 
the Kleinian and post-Kleinian psychoanalytic tradition in similar terms, she describing them as  
advances towards more comprehensive explanations and theories.  
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to be anomalies in the clinical phenomena they encountered in their consulting 
rooms, in the context of what they expected to occur in the light of pre-established 
theories. Advances, it should be said at this point, have as often taken the form of 
a discovery or recognition of a new ‘kind’,  the identification of  new differences 
within a system of classification, or of the necessity for a new classification, as of 
new ‘laws’  - that is to say, conjunctions of variables which can be held to constitute 
relations of cause and effect. Classification  is an under-recognised but  essential   
form of knowledge and understanding in psychoanalysis, as it is in other fields of 
investigation which are  descriptive and particularising in their interest.  
 
How is it that a field which in its clinical practice is so attentive to differences 
among clients, and which has to work in ‘outdoor’ settings with whatever self-
selected patients walk through the door,  nevertheless seems to have theories 
clearly enough formulated  for them to generate recognisable anomalies?  How 
can a psychoanalyst identify an analysand’s presentation as ‘exceptional’  in 
relation to an accepted theory, and therefore as calling for reconsideration of the 
assumptions or predictions of the theory, when the clinical need is to consider all 
patients as idiosyncratic individuals,  more than as mere exemplars of a ‘kind’, 
whether this be understood as the outcome of a pattern of infantile development, a 
personality disorder, or merely a persisting state of mind?   
 
It seems that theoretical reflection and innovation requires a particular mind-set 
among analysts who undertake it, different from their normal clinical approach.  To 
think theoretically, it is necessary for analysts to think of  patients explicitly within 
certain theoretical descriptions, even if this only partially represents the totality of 
the analyst’s understanding of them.   Since some theoretical descriptions will in 
any case capture more of the shaping features of a patient’s state of mind or 
difficulties than others, there is nothing necessarily  clinically   harmful in this.  
Indeed, such a specific  theoretical focus may be invaluable in treating an 
individual case,  capturing  a  key obstacle to therapeutic progress. In the same 
way, someone whose work is at the frontier of horticultural or medical science may 
be just the specialist  one needs to consult to deal with a particularly mysterious or 
recalcitrant disease. Nevertheless, the aptitudes found in analysts who are  
theoretically the most innovative, and in those who are the most effective clinicians, 
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may be by no means identical.  It is possible for an analyst preoccupied with the 
advancement of a specific idea to focus too exclusively on  aspects of patients 
which are relevant to this idea,  and not be  interested enough in the patient as a 
whole person.  This need for analysts who are theoretically innovative to think 
more abstractly, beyond the immediate clinical situation, may help to explain the 
differences between everyday clinical practice, where the problem is to make use 
of an extensive lexicon of potentially relevant classifications  in relation to particular 
patients, and the practice of psychoanalytic clinical research where the primary 
object of reflection is the lexicon of ideas  itself, and its theoretical adequacy.  
Nevertheless, because of the primary clinical source of psychoanalytic knowledge, 
it does seem that many of the most significant innovators have also been 
exceptional clinicians.  
 
 
Many examples of discoveries taking the form of  answers to theoretical problems 
revealed by anomalies can be cited from the history of psychoanalysis. One of the 
earliest is  Freud's realisation (Freud 1905) that  not all of the abusive sexual 
experiences recounted by his women patients were likely to have occurred in 
reality, and his conjecture, relevant to explaining their hysterical symptoms, that  
some of these might have been the expression of unconscious fantasies.  Freud 
thought, rightly or wrongly, that the facts reported by these  patients were unlikely 
all to describe real events,   and sought an explanation which  focused on a 
different explanation of their beliefs – namely their relation to unconscious desires 
which had been subject to repression.16  Melanie Klein (1945, 1952) convinced the 
majority of the  small psychoanalytic community who were present during the 
Controversial Discussions of the British Psychoanalytical Society of 1941-45 (King 
and Steiner 1994)  that a complex mental life including elements of phantasy 
began considerably earlier in infancy  than Freud had thought, when he had given 
his account of the onset of the Oedipus Complex towards the end of the first year 
of life.  She did this by citing clinical evidence provided by her psychoanalytic work 
with young children, using the new  techniques of play therapy  by which she had 
made feasible their psychoanalytic treatment.  Her grounds for belief in the 
 20 
unconscious mental life of infants remained indirect,  being  based on  inferences 
drawn  from clinical material from the analysis of children who were beyond 
infancy,  17  but it was judged to provide  evidence of significant  discrepancies with 
Freud's established theory nevertheless. 18 
 
A third example of advance by recognition of anomaly is Heimann's discovery of a 
new approach to  the 'counter-transference'.  (Heimann 1950). She found that  
'counter-transference' phenomena (feelings aroused in the analyst within the 
psychoanalytic setting) need not be regarded, as conventional psychoanalytic 
thinking then held,  as a mere interference with  analytic perception derived from  
subjective difficulties within the analyst,  but could be viewed  as a new source of 
clinical information about a  patient. She made this discovery by reflecting at length 
on her own persistent feelings of disturbance in relation to a particular analysand.  
She came to conjecture that these disturbances were in fact being communicated 
to her unconsciously, or projected into her, by her patient. Melanie Klein had 
developed at this time the concept of projective identification (Klein 1946). This 
was  characterised as the expulsion of unwanted feelings and aspects of the self 
into others  used as recipients for them, who were then misperceived as 
possessors of these qualities. This psychic mechanism was seen to offer a causal 
explanation of this  unconscious communication, and subsequently   interest in the 
counter-transference and in projective identification have evolved in close relation 
to one another. Because modern psychoanalytic practitioners now deal frequently 
with  more  severe disturbances of personality in which mechanisms of splitting 
and projective identification are significant, counter-transference  has moved from 
being regarded as mainly a disturbance of, and hindrance to,  psychoanalytic 
understanding, to becoming one of the key  resources of its technique.    
                                                                                                                                     
16
 Critics like Masson (1984) have subsequently attacked Freud for ignoring or concealing the 
evidence of actual sexual abuse in these patients, in justification of his hypothesis.  
17
 Later more systematic empirical observations of infants have made Klein's ideas seem less 
implausible than they might once have seemed. For example, it is now known that infants can 
recognise their mothers by sound and smell very soon after birth, and what Stern calls 'attunement' 
between mother and baby begins very early in their interactions.  
18
 Anna Freud and her followers were resistant to Klein's new ideas, and sought to refute them by 
reference to the canonical status of Sigmund Freud's writings. It is a signal feature of the 
Controversial Discussions however that criteria of clinical evidence were given higher priority than 
theoretical orthodoxy. The 'Independent' English psychoanalyst observers of this doctrinal served 
as the arbiters of this battle between the Viennese and the Germans, in this way it seems to me 
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As fourth example, I will take ideas of  Herbert Rosenfeld (1971, 1987) who came 
to question the adequacy of the established definition of narcissism as a pathology  
based primarily on a state of libidinal ‘self-love’.  His doubt  occurred when he 
found that a particular patient who seemed to be manifesting a highly narcissistic 
state of mind nevertheless failed to respond to interpretations put to him in these 
terms, however carefully they were formulated.  Rosenfeld conjectured that the 
patient’s narcissistic state of mind might be based on his identification with a 
destructive conception of himself, dominated by hatred,  rather than by idealisation 
of himself as possessing all that was good.  He found that this patient did respond 
to this different description of himself, and that this more truthful or accurate 
interpretation  made a difference,  taking the analysis out of an impasse.  
Rosenfeld’s  discovery of the new psychoanalytic classification  of ‘destructive 
narcissism’ , proved to be a clinically and theoretically fruitful one, giving rise for 
example to his  and Meltzer’s (1968) related understandings of the mentality of the 
‘internal gang’, ruthless in its persecution of weakness and taking pleasure in its 
own cruelty.     
 
Rosenfeld carefully described the clinical anomaly which led to his insight,  but we 
can also  recognise the  theoretical plausibility of the idea that narcissism might  
take a destructive as well as a libidinal form, given the postulate within the Freud-
Klein tradition of a duality of impulses of love and hate, of both life and death 
instincts. In the British psychoanalytic tradition, there have been few theoretical 
discoveries that have not been grounded in and justified by reference to  clinical 
data,  but it is nevertheless clear that a capacity to see the logical implications of a 
theoretical model of the mind has also been fundamental to psychoanalytic 
creativity.  In this field, advances have always depended on a conjunction of 
theoretical and clinical  insight, usually  located in the same innovative mind. It is 
incidentally because of the fundamental importance of clinical case-material for the 
clarification and exemplification of psychoanalytic ideas that inhibitions on the   
publication of case-material, under pressures of modern cultures of ethical 
                                                                                                                                     
ensuring the hegemony  of an empiricist spirit of the consulting room in British psychoanalysis from 
that time onwards.  
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regulation and risk-aversion,  pose a serious risk to the advancement of ideas in 
the field.   
 
Most   new discoveries in  the  British tradition of psychoanalysis are  accounted for 
and justified by reference to clinical experience,  though mostly not with the 
decisive theoretical consequences of the  examples I have given . Case-examples 
almost  invariably figure in the exposition of  new concepts, theories, and 
techniques, both as the primary ground for holding these to be  credible,  and as a 
means of making them intelligible and usable, as instances and analogues, for 
other clinical practitioners.   Latour (1983) has written about the characteristic 
'inscription devices' of different sciences - maps for geographers,  statistics for 
epidemiologists, ethnographies for anthropologists, reports of experiments in many 
fields. The primary inscription device for psychoanalysis is  the clinical case-report, 
presented as the exemplification of a new classification and/or theoretical 
conjecture. Freud's famous case-histories were the foundational or 'revolutionary' 
instances of this genre,  but its normative role in this field has continued throughout 
its history.    
 
There are probably some elements of presentational convention in the priority 
given to case-examples. Psychoanalysts deeply immersed in the theoretical  
constructions of psychoanalysis must sometimes develop new ideas speculatively, 
exploiting the potential but unrecognised implications of existing ideas, without 
necessarily having particular analysands in mind. But in the  professional practice 
of psychoanalysis in Britain (its academic studycan be  another matter) no-one 
seems to have much interest in  new concepts and theories unless and until they 
are shown to have a clinical application. There seems to be a shared consensus 
that theoretical speculations in this field rapidly lose connectedness with their true 
object, actual psychic experience,  unless they are continually brought up against 
instances of it, and made to do work in giving it definition  and explanation. One 
notices, in meetings of psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic child psychotherapists, 
how interest  becomes more intense at  the moment when clinical material begins 
to be  discussed, in detailed reports of sessions with patients or in discussion of a 
dream, still regarded by many practitioners as the 'royal road to the unconscious'.  
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Because of the priority given to clinical evidence in the development of 
psychoanalytic knowledge, great emphasis is placed in the field on the craft-skills 
of clinical practice, as a precondition of understanding of unconscious mental 
phenomena.  These craft-skills are complex. They include the  capacity to  
discriminate accurately and reliably between different states of mind and feeling, 
and between one kind of communication and another. Also, the ability of therapists  
to be in a room with patients in ways which they will find 'containing', in the  
psychoanalytic sense of that term which implies a capacity for  receptive 
understanding.  And, in the case of severe disturbances in patients, to stand up to 
burdensome and stressful projections and enactments without losing the capacity 
for reflection.  Psychoanalytic work with children, and with other particular 
categories of patient, involves more specific capacities,  for example to be able to 
work with children's play as a primary therapeutic tool. 
 
The possession or otherwise of these craft skills in analysts are important criteria 
by which the psychoanalytic community selects between competing ideas, in 
deciding which of them have an explanatory and a therapeutically productive 
relation to clinical experience, and which do not. To be sure,  equivalent craft skills 
are the basis of all other organised systems of inquiry and knowledge-generation: 
those skills,  for example, which enable historians to decide whether a colleague's 
interpretation of documents is soundly based or not; or which enable laboratory 
scientists to assess colleagues' experimental skills.  There is certainly scope and 
need for analysts to make more explicit what their procedures  of inference from 
clinical material actually are.   This requires some greater separation between 
evidence, represented by full transcripts of clinical sessions, for example, and its 
subsequent theoretical interpretation.  Most psychoanalytic case reports, as critics  
within psychoanalysis (Spence  1983, 1994)  have complained, combine evidence 
and interpretation in a form which makes it difficult to distinguish one from another. 
19W.R. Bion states  at the opening of one of his books Attention and Interpretation, 
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 In clinical research currently being developed at the Tavistock Clinic and the University of East 
London, in part within Professional Doctorate programmes in psychoanalytic child psychotherapy 
and related disciplines, efforts are being made to develop methods of  analysis of clinical data to 
achieve more formal rigour and transparency than is usually achieved within the traditional modes 
of the writing-up of cases (Rustin 2003b).  Because the open-ended and receptive approach of 
clinical analysis  is held to be essential to its distinctive object of study (unconscious mental life) it is 
being found more  feasible to give a more formalised  basis  to the analysis of data (for example 
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(1970) 'I doubt if anyone but a practising psycho-analyst can understand this book 
although I have done my best to make it simple.' Although Bion was  being more 
uncompromising in his assertion of this precondition of understanding than most 
psychoanalysts have been,  the fact is that  psychoanalytic writing often assumes 
that its readers bring  the experience of clinicians to it. It is not always clear what is 
meant to be ‘technical’ or 'professional' writing, and what is meant to be accessible 
to lay readers.  
 
Psychoanalytic training – a scientific apprenticeship   
 
A large part of psychoanalytic education and training is designed to enable 
students to learn the particular skills and sensibilities necessary to function 
competently in the consulting room situation.  A variety of methods  have been 
devised over time to achieve this,   which include naturalistic infant and young 
observation, personal analysis 20, regular discussion of reports of the emotional 
dimensions of individuals'  work-experiences, and clinical supervision.21 These 
methods have in common a focus on observing  and discriminating  the fine detail 
of  states of mind and feeling as they are  produced in emotionally-charged 
situations. It is through such habits of discrimination, including sensitivity to the 
subtleties of verbal and non-verbal communication,  that analytic trainees learn to 
                                                                                                                                     
using methods of 'grounded theory')  than to its collection in clinical settings, though some limited 
standardisation, for example by  diagnostic category and prescribed  duration of treatment is being 
achieved in data collection too.  
20
 Having personal analysis is a necessary requirement of clinical training, in some institutions 
sometimes conducted according to the particular conventions of a 'training analysis' , but in others 
made as similar to an ordinary personal analysis as possible.  (One of the differences lies in how 
close or distant the analyst is kept from decisions about the professional progress of the candidate). 
One of its main functions is to enable candidates to learn from their own experience about the 
unconscious dimensions of human feeling, communication and action. One clinician told me that 
she recognised in her own analysis that she had learned something inwardly when she understood 
that the plant she had given her analyst as a Christmas present was a plant in more senses than 
one. The problem in this work is to keep the mind open in the face of uncertainty, and to avoid 
arriving at premature definition and classification before the full complexity of an experience have 
been digested. Bion's famous adjuration to analysts to eschew memory and desire when entering 
their consulting rooms refers to this necessity to tolerate uncertainty.  
21
 I have discussed these methods in greater detail in Rustin (2003a).  One of the goals of these 
these practices of observation and written report is to teach  skills of ostensive definition, in regard 
to states of feeling.  
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recognise the unconscious aspects of mental life that are the particular field of 
interest of psychoanalysis. 22 
 
Parallel with their  learning from observational and clinical experience,      trainees 
are expected to  become familiar with the major concepts and theories of their 
psychoanalytic tradition. This  is learned from its literature, but also through  
repeated juxtapositions  between what has been observed  in others or the self, 
and this lexicon of ideas, which have come to form a ramifying and complex  array 
as the field has developed. 23    It is a remarkable attribute of psychoanalysis that  
its theories can be formulated abstractly as laws of normal and pathological 
development, and as different models of psychic structure, even though their 
clinical application to individuals is unavoidably contingent and approximate.  
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 Accuracy of recall is important in this work, since in almost all of these training and therapeutic 
settings, notes are written up immediately after and not during sessions. This is one of the 
capacities which is learned through writing up very large numbers of sessions of different kinds in 
the course of a therapeutic training. Weekly infant observation of one hour per week over  one or 
two years is often the first of these learning experiences.  
23
 Mappings of the field in the Kleinian tradition are provided in Spillius ( 1988) and in a different 
form by Hinshelwood (1989). There are equivalent surveys and dictionaries for other psychoanalytic 
traditions.  
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